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ABSTRACT 
 
The definition of deposit substitutes in Philippine tax law fails to consider the 
maturity of a debt instrument. This makes it possible for long-term bonds to be considered 
as deposit substitutes if they meet the 20-lender rule, taxable at 20% final tax. However, 
long-term debt instruments cannot realistically function as deposit substitutes even if they 
fall in the hands of 20 or more lenders. First, long-term debt instruments cannot 
simultaneously replicate the twin features of capital preservation and liquidity, which are 
integral to the nature of a deposit substitute. Second, deposit substitutes are an integral 
part of the maturity transformation process (i.e. short-term borrowing for the purpose of 
long-term lending) in financial intermediaries, which means that they should have low 
borrowing cost, made possible only by having short-term maturity. 
To prove these propositions, this paper situates the function of deposit substitutes 
within the context of shadow banking, where said instruments originated and are 
generally used. To show the incompatibility between a deposit substitute and a long-term 
debt instrument, the paper applies the fundamental theory of bond values to 10-year zero-
coupon treasury notes called “PEACe Bonds” in Banco De Oro, et al. vs. Republic (2015 
and 2016). The paper recommends that deposit substitutes should be limited to debt 
instruments with maturity of not more than 1 year. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997 provides the following 
definition for deposit substitutes: 
 
“[A]n alternative from of obtaining funds from the public (the term 'public' means borrowing 
from twenty [20] or more individual or corporate lenders at any one time) other than 
deposits, through the issuance, endorsement, or acceptance of debt instruments for the 
borrowers own account, for the purpose of relending or purchasing of receivables and other 
obligations, or financing their own needs or the needs of their agent or dealer.”1 
 
This definition fails to include one important element: the maturity of a debt 
instrument. This omission leads to absurd results, such as the possible characterization 
of a 10-year zero-coupon treasury note as a deposit substitute if it falls in the hands of 20 
or more lenders. This is exemplified by the PEACe Bonds in Banco De Oro, et al. vs. 
Republic (G.R. No. 198756, January 13, 2015) and Banco De Oro, et al. vs. Republic 
(G.R. No. 198756, August 16, 2016). Under Section 22(Y) of the NIRC of 1997, it is a 
matter of indifference whether the principal amount is payable in 1 year, 5 years, or 30 
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1 Sec. 22(Y), R.A. No. 8424 
years, as long as the bond or note meets the 20-lender rule.2 However, there is simply no 
conceivable way that long-term debt instruments can function “like” a deposit. To call a 
10-year debt instrument a “substitute” for deposit is a serious error in conceptualization, 
and revolts against basic principles of finance.3 
A deposit substitute is intended to be the economic equivalent of a bank deposit.4 
A debt instrument can only fulfill this role if it replicates or approximates a bank deposit’s 
safety features.5 These features are (i) capital preservation or safety of principal, and (ii) 
liquidity, if not withdrawability upon demand.6 By nature, long-term debt instruments 
cannot do this, even if the issuer is the Republic of the Philippines or any sovereign entity.7 
A time to maturity of 10 years, coupled with lack of interest payments during the life of the 
instrument, exposes the bond to significant interest rate risk and price volatility.8 
Bond prices fall if interest rates increase, and bond prices increase if interest rates 
decrease.9 Hence, in an environment with rising interest rates, the value of a bond held 
by an investor may decrease below his initial investment.10 The investor has two options: 
to sell the instrument prior to maturity at a loss, or to wait until maturity to redeem the 
instrument at par. If the investor chooses to sell at a loss, this negates the first safety 
feature of deposits: capital preservation. On the other hand, if he chooses to wait until 
maturity, this negates the second safety feature: liquidity. The fact that uncontrollable 
factors, like prevailing market interest rates, can adversely affect the performance of the 
investment makes a long-term debt instrument incompatible with the perceived “safety” 
of deposits.11 Therefore, long-term debt instruments can never be deposit substitutes. 
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Financial history supports this conclusion. Deposit substitutes are rooted in the 
shadow banking system.12 “Shadow banks” are financial institutions that have bank-like 
functions but do not have the requisite license to operate as commercial banks, and are 
therefore not covered by bank regulation.13 Like traditional banks, shadow banks engage 
in “maturity transformation”, or the process of short-term borrowing for the purpose of 
long-term lending.14 
Through maturity transformation, short-term liabilities in the form of “deposits” 
generate lesser interest expense, while long-term assets in the form of “loans” generate 
higher interest income, resulting in net interest income.15 However, instead of borrowing 
from the public in the form of “deposits”, shadow banks borrow in the form of “shadow 
deposits”, which are also called “quasi-deposits”, and which is just another term for 
“deposit substitutes”.16 And because shadow banks must keep the cost of borrowing low, 
it must necessarily resort to short-term borrowing.17 This is why deposit substitutes 
necessarily have short-term maturity.18 
The definition of deposit substitutes in the tax code ignores this context. It is 
therefore the task of this paper to illuminate this unexamined portion of the tax law, with 
a view toward a proper definition. The roadmap for discussion is as follows: 
 
• Part I summarizes the tax implication of classifying a debt instrument as a 
deposit substitute under Section 22(Y) of the NIRC of 1997. 
 
• Part II provides an overview of Banco De Oro, et al. vs. Republic (2015) 
and Banco De Oro, et al. vs. Republic (2016). 
 
• Part III explains the underlying relationship between interest rates and 
maturity of debt instruments through the concept of a Yield Curve. This is 
necessary to understand why banks and financial institutions borrow in the 
short-term and lend in the long-term. 
 
• Part IV explains the paradigmatic function of banking: short-term borrowing 
for the purpose of long-term lending, otherwise called as Maturity 
Transformation. This is important to understand the activity of shadow 
banks (which replicate the activity of banks) and the nature of deposit 
substitutes (which replicate the nature of deposits). 
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 • Part V explains the features that make bank deposits relatively safe 
compared to other asset classes, and explains how banks provide safety to 
deposits. 
 
• Part VI explains the shadow banking system, which is a set of practices that 
simulate traditional banking activity without bank regulation. This part also 
explains the origin of deposit substitutes, which are intended to simulate 
traditional bank deposits as a source of funding. 
 
• Part VII explains how deposit substitutes replicate the safety of deposits 
without being governed by the prudential requirements imposed on banks. 
 
• Part VIII explains why long-term debt instruments cannot function as 
substitutes for deposits through a discussion of the fundamental theory of 
bond values.  
 
• Part IX applies the fundamental theory of bond values to the PEACe bonds, 
and demonstrate why 10-year zero-coupon treasury notes cannot function 
as deposit substitutes. 
 
• Part X proposes a new definition for deposit substitutes by incorporating the 
concept of maturity. 
 
PART I: TAX IMPLICATION OF DEPOSIT SUBSTITUTES 
 
The present definition of deposit substitutes in Section 22(Y) of the NIRC of 1997 
is substantially the same as the definition in Section 95 of the New Central Bank Act. First, 
it is an alternative form of obtaining funds other than deposits. Second, the funds are 
obtained from the “public”, which is defined as borrowing from 20 or more lenders at any 
one time. Third, the funds are obtained through the issuance, endorsement, or 
acceptance of debt instruments. Fourth, the use of funds is for the purpose of relending 
or purchasing of receivables and other obligations, or financing their own needs or the 
needs of an agent or dealer.19 
The Manual of Regulation for Banks (MORB) recognizes the following examples 
of deposit substitutes: (i) repurchase agreements or “repos”, (ii) promissory notes, (iii) 
certificates of participation with recourse, and (iv) certificates of assignment with 
recourse.20 
The tax implication of classifying a debt instrument as a deposit substitute is 
illustrated as follows: 
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 A debt instrument is an evidence of an obligation by a borrower to pay the lender 
the borrowed amount with interest at maturity. If it meets the elements under Section 
22(Y), it is classified as a deposit substitute. 
A debt instrument generates two types of gains: (i) trading gain and (ii) interest 
income. Trading gain pertains to the income by a holder of a debt instrument for selling 
the instrument prior to maturity, or for retiring the instrument at maturity. Interest income 
pertains to the gain for parting with the use of funds. 
 Regardless of whether a debt instrument is a deposit substitute or not, the 
treatment of trading gain is the same, pursuant to Section 32(B)(7)(g) of the NIRC, which 
provides: 
 
“Sec. 32. Gross Income. – […] 
 
(B) Exclusions from Gross Income. - The following items shall not be included in gross 
income and shall be exempt from taxation under this title: […] 
 
(7) Miscellaneous Items. – […] 
 
(g) Gains from the Sale of Bonds, Debentures or other Certificate of Indebtedness. - Gains 
realized from the sale or exchange or retirement of bonds, debentures or other certificate 
of indebtedness with a maturity of more than five (5) years.” 
 
 The trading gain from debt instruments with maturity of more than 5 years is 
excluded from gross income. Otherwise, it is included in gross income and subject to the 
regular income tax rate. 
 Interest income on deposit substitutes has two possible tax treatments. It is 
generally subject to 20% final withholding tax, pursuant to Sections 24(B)(1), 25(A)(2), 
27(D)(1), and 28(A)(7)(a). However, it is exempt from income taxation if the instrument is 
held for more than 5 years and classified as Long-Term Deposit or Investment Certificate 
under Section 22(FF) of the NIRC, which states: 
 
“(FF) The term "long-term deposit or investment certificates" shall refer to certificate of 
time deposit or investment in the form of savings, common or individual trust funds, 
deposit substitutes, investment management accounts and other investments with a 
maturity period of not less than five (5) years, the form of which shall be prescribed by 
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and issued by banks only (not by nonbank 
financial intermediaries and finance companies) to individuals in denominations of Ten 
thousand pesos (P10,000) and other denominations as may be prescribed by the BS.” 
 
 If the taxpayer pre-terminates the instrument, the interest income is subject to 5%, 
12%, or 20% depending on the length of time when the instrument was held. 
 Finally, interest income on debt instruments that are not deposit substitutes are not 
subject to 20% final withholding tax, but to the regular income tax rate. 
 The tax implication of classifying a debt instrument as deposit substitute has 
drastic economic consequences. It can mean billions of potential tax revenues, or 
potential tax liability. This is exemplified by the landmark decisions of Banco De Oro, et 
al. vs. Republic (G.R. No. 198756, January 13, 2015) and Banco De Oro, et al. vs. 
Republic (G.R. No. 198756, August 16, 2016) on PEACe Bonds, discussed in the next 
section. 
 
PART II: OVERVIEW OF BANCO DE ORO, ET AL. VS. REPUBLIC 
 
 On 23 March 2001, the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) 
requested the Department of Finance to issue 10-year zero-coupon Treasury Certificates 
through the Bureau of Treasury. The CODE-NGO proposed to purchase the Certificates 
through a special purpose vehicle, which in turn will re-package the Certificates as PEACe 
Bonds to be sold at a premium to investors. The proceeds of the bond issuance will be 
placed in the Hanapbuhay Fund, which is a permanent fund to finance the projects of 
accredited Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). 
 On 31 May 2001, the BIR issued Ruling No. 020-2001, which states that the 10-year 
zero coupon bonds are not deposit substitutes, and therefore not subject to 20% final 
withholding tax, because they will be originally issued to only one entity: CODE-NGO. To 
be a deposit substitute, the funds must be obtained from twenty (20) or more borrowers. 
 Subsequently, the BIR issued Ruling No. 035-2001 dated 16 August 2011 and 
Ruling No. DA-175-01 dated 29 September 2001, both reiterating that the 10-year zero-
coupon bonds are not deposit substitutes for failing to meet the 20-lender rule. 
Specifically, the phrase “at any one time” is to be determined at the time of the original 
issuance of the bonds. 
 The Bureau of Treasury decided not to issue the bonds to a special purpose vehicle 
of CODE-NGO because it is not a Government Securities Eligible Dealer (GSED). Hence, 
on 09 October 2001, it issued a Notice of Public Offering of Treasury Bonds to all GSEDs, 
stating that P30 billion worth of 10-year zero-coupon bonds will be auctioned on 16 
October 2001. The Notice specifically provides that the bonds will not be issued to more 
than 19 buyers or lenders.  
 On 16 October 2001, the Bureau of Treasury held the auction for the 10-year zero-
coupon bonds. RCBC Capital, which participated on behalf of CODE-NGO, was declared 
as the winning bidder. On the same date, RCBC Capital and CODE-NGO executed an 
Underwriting Agreement, with RCBC Capital as the Issue Manager and Lead Underwriter 
for the offering of the PEACe Bonds. 
 On 18 October 2001, the Bureau of Treasury issued P35 billion worth of zero-
coupon bonds to RCBC, with yield-to-maturity of 12.75%, for approximately P10.17 
billion, resulting in a discount of approximately P24.83 billion. 
 Subsequently, RCBC Capital sold the bonds in the secondary market for an issue 
price of approximately P11.99 billion. The purchasers include Banco de Oro, Bank of 
Commerce, China Banking Corporation, Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, Philippine 
Bank of Communications, Philippine National Bank, Philippine Veterans Bank, and 
Planters Development Bank. 
 On 07 October 2011, the BIR issued Ruling No. 370-2011, which states that PEACe 
Bonds are deposit substitutes, and therefore the discount of P24.83 billion is treated as 
interest income subject to 20% final withholding tax, pursuant to Section 27(D)(1) of the 
NIRC of 1997. Pursuant to the ruling, the Secretary of Finance directed the Bureau of 
Treasury to withhold the tax from the face value of the PEACe Bonds upon payment at 
maturity. As a consequence, the holders of the PEACe Bonds filed a petition for certiorari, 
prohibition and/or mandamus before the Supreme Court. 
 The issue before the Court was whether the PEACe Bonds are deposit substitutes. 
In the Decision dated January 13, 2015, the Court ruled as follows:  
 
“Applying Section 22(Y) of the National Internal Revenue Code, we held that the number 
of lenders/investors at every transaction is determinative of whether a debt instrument is a 
deposit substitute subject to 20% final withholding tax. When at any transaction, funds are 
simultaneously obtained from 20 or more lenders/investors, there is deemed to be a public 
borrowing and the bonds at that point in time are deemed deposit substitutes. 
Consequently, the seller is required to withhold the 20% final withholding tax on the 
imputed interest income from the bonds. We further declared void BIR Rulings Nos. 370-
2011 and DA 378-2011 for having disregarded the 20-lender rule provided in Section 
22(Y).” 
 
 The Court issued a Resolution in August 16, 2016, affirming the 2015 Decision on 
the nature of deposit substitutes: 
 
“[…] in light of Section 22(Y), the reckoning of whether there are 20 or more individuals 
or corporate lenders is crucial in determining the tax treatment of the yield from the 
debt instrument. In other words, if there are 20 or more lenders, the debt instrument is 
considered a deposit substitute and subject to 20% final withholding tax.” 
 
 As will be discussed, however, the 20-lender rule should not be the only 
determining factor for classifying a debt instrument as a deposit substitute. The maturity 
of the instrument is also essential. 
 
PART III: THE YIELD CURVE 
 
 The elements of a debt instrument are: (i) principal amount, (ii) coupon, (iii) maturity, 
(iv) yield, (v) time to maturity, and (vi) coupon structure. The principal amount is the 
amount borrowed by the issuer.21 The coupon is the consideration paid to the lender for 
lending the principal amount.22 The maturity is the date when the lender is obliged to 
repay the principal amount.23 The yield is the rate of return on the investment.24 The time 
to maturity is the remaining time before the principal amount is repaid.25 The coupon 
structure is the timing and frequency of coupon payments.26 
 The yield curve is a graph that describes the relationship between the yield and the 
time to maturity.27 It is represented by an upward-sloping curve, which indicates that the 
longer is the time to maturity, the higher is the yield.28 The following is an example of a 
yield curve for government bonds in the Philippines29: 
 
 
      
The shape of the yield curve is generally upward-sloping.30 One explanation for 
this is the liquidity premium theory, which states that investors prefer highly liquid and 
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short-term assets, and therefore investors demand a higher return on investment from a 
long-term debt instrument to compensate them for the risk of giving up liquidity for a longer 
period.31 A long time to maturity exposes the investment to several risks, such as the 
possibility of default, changes in interest rates, and changes in the price of the 
instrument.32 This theory merely restates one of the central principles of investment: that 
the greater is the risk assumed by the investor, the greater is the expected return.33 This 
is important to understand the process of maturity transformation in banks and non-bank 
financial intermediaries. 
 
PART IV: MATURITY TRANSFORMATION 
 
Maturity transformation is the process of short-term borrowing for the purpose of 
long-term lending.34 As shown in Part III, short-term debt instruments generally have 
lower yields compared to long-term debt instruments.35 To make a profit, a bank must 
issue short-term debt instruments and invest in long-term assets.36 Issuing short-term 
debt instruments entail low borrowing cost, while investing in long-term debt instruments 
entail higher yields.37 
A bank deposit is technically a short-term debt instrument.38 It is short-term 
because a deposit is withdrawable by the depositor upon demand.39 Of course, the 
depositor may choose not to withdraw the deposit for a long period of time, but this does 
not affect the short-term character of the instrument.40 
In the Philippines, deposit interest rates have an average of 9.13% from CY 1980 
to CY 2015.41 The all-time high rate is 21.17%, which happened in CY 1984.42 The all-
time low is 1.23% in CY 2014.43 It hit 1.6% in CY 2015. The following shows the trend of 
deposit interest rates:44 
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Loans, which are funded by bank deposits, are typically long-term in character, 
and therefore entail higher returns.45 Bank lending rates in the Philippines have an 
average of 13.45% from CY 1976 to CY 2016, with an all-time high of 39.73% in CY 1984 
and an all-time low of 5.09% in CY 2015.46 The following is the trend of bank lending 
rates:47 
 
 
 
Deposits are liabilities of the bank, while loans are assets.48 Interest expense on 
deposits represents the cost of borrowing, while interest income on the loans represents 
return on investment.49 The difference between the cost of borrowing and the return on 
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investment is called the spread.50 The wider is the spread, the higher is the profit of the 
bank.51 
 
PART V: SAFETY FEATURES OF TRADITIONAL BANK DEPOSITS 
 
A bank deposit is a special form of debt instrument, described as follows: 
 
“First, they are demand-debt instruments, which means they give depositors the legal 
right to withdraw their money at will. Second, they give depositors the ability to 
withdraw their money at virtually no cost. And third, they are subject to only negligible 
interest rate risk.”52 
 
 In short, the first safety feature is withdrawability upon demand or liquidity, and the 
second is safety of principal. The third feature is only a restatement of the second—i.e. 
interest rate risk only affects the price of the instrument, which in turn affects the safety 
of principal.53 As will be explained in Part VIII, the relationship between the price of a debt 
instrument and prevailing market interest rates is inverse.54 Hence, a negligible interest 
rate risk only means that there is very low probability of devaluation in the value of a 
deposit.55 
 The perceived safety of bank deposits is due to bank regulation, which imposes 
the following prudential requirements or limitations: (i) capital requirements, (ii) deposit 
insurance, (iii) reserve requirements, (iv) government liquidity facilities, (v) periodic 
supervisory examinations, (vi) Single Borrower’s Limit, (vii) Directors, Officers, 
Stockholders and their Related Interests (DOSRI) Limits, (viii) investment limitations, and 
(ix) other prudential regulatory requirements.56 
 Implementing these strict regulatory measures to protect bank deposits is an 
additional economic burden on banks.57 These measures constitute huge regulatory 
costs in doing business.58 Meanwhile, no similar measures were initially imposed on 
money market mutual funds and other non-bank financial institutions.59 This explains the 
eventual rise of deposit substitutes.60 
 There are three major protections that deposit substitutes lack: (i) mandatory 
deposit insurance coverage, (ii) reserve requirements, and (iii) stringent capital 
requirements.61 
                                                 
50 Krishna, C.N.V., Ritchken, P.H., and Thomson, J.B., On Credit-Spread Slopes and Predicting Bank Risk, 
38 JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 6, 1545-1574 (2006) 
51 Id. 
52 Supra note 5. 
53 Craine, R.N., and Pierce, J.L., Interest Rate Risk, 13 THE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 4, 719-732 (1978) 
54 Brennan, M.J., and Schwartz, E.S., Bond Pricing and Market Efficiency, 38 FINANCIAL ANALYSTS JOURNAL 
5, 49-56 (1982) 
55 Id. 
56 R.A. No. 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000) 
57 Supra note 5. 
58 Id. 
59 Supra note 12. 
60 Id. 
61 Levitin, A.J., Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 1, 357-
455 (2016) 
 
A. Mandatory Deposit Insurance Coverage 
 
 Bank deposits are required to be covered by a state deposit insurance system.62 
This serves to protect depositors from the risk of non-payment of deposits in case the 
bank becomes insolvent.63 The impetus for this coverage is again the Great Depression, 
when there were several bank runs and depositors not getting their deposits back.64 The 
deposit insurance system obligates banks to pay a certain percentage of their deposits, 
in the form of premiums, to a deposit insurer.65 When the bank is closed down by the 
monetary board, the deposit insurer indemnifies the depositors to the extent that they are 
unable to immediately recover from the bank.66 The indemnification, however, is only up 
to a certain limit. The portion of the deposit not covered by the insurance may still be 
recovered from the assets of the bank upon dissolution and liquidation.67 
 
B. Reserve Requirements 
 
 Reserve requirements or cash reserve ratio obligates banks to set aside a fraction 
of deposits which they cannot lend out to the borrowing public.68 The bank either retains 
the bank deposits in the vault or further deposits them with the central bank.69 The reserve 
requirement is one of the monetary tools of the central bank in influencing the level of 
interest rates.70 
 
C. Stringent Capital Requirements 
 
 Banking institutions are required to have capital adequacy through the imposition 
and observance of minimum capital requirements.71 Today, the global standard 
regulatory framework for capital adequacy is the Third Basel Accord or Basel III, which 
provides that banks must have common equity of 4.5% of risk-weighted assets.72 
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PART VI: THE RISE OF DEPOSIT SUBSTITUTES THROUGH THE SHADOW BANKING 
SYSTEM 
 
Shadow banks are non-bank financial institutions which mirror the maturity 
transformation process in banks.73 Both traditional banks and shadow banks issue short-
term debt instruments as a source of funding—i.e. deposits in the case of banks and 
deposit substitutes in the case of shadow banks.74 They both invest in long-term debt 
instruments—i.e. loans in the case of banks, and receivables, bonds, and notes in the 
case of shadow banks.75 In short, shadow banks are direct competitors of banks, and 
shadow banks have a competitive advantage because they are not covered by bank 
regulation.76 Historically, a lax regulatory environment allowed shadow banks to expand 
operations faster than licensed banks.77 
Over time, however, laws were introduced allowing traditional banks to do 
whatever shadow banks were doing.78 This is the reason why universal and commercial 
banks are now allowed to have “quasi-banking” functions.79 This is the reason why banks 
do not merely issue deposits, but also “quasi-deposits”.80 Quasi-banking is just another 
term for shadow banking, and quasi-deposit is just another term for deposit substitute.81 
 
A. Money Market Funds as the First Shadow Banks 
 
The issuance of quasi-deposits or deposit substitutes was initially done by money 
market funds.82 Through a money market fund, a non-bank financial institution accepts 
cash from the public, which is used by the institution to purchase short-term debt 
securities, such as treasury bills and commercial papers.83 The clients are technically 
“lenders” and the non-bank financial institutions are “borrowers”.84 The borrowers oblige 
themselves to pay a fixed rate of interest to the lenders.85 They profit from the difference 
between the yields on the investment instruments and the interest rate obligation.86 The 
first money market fund in the U.S. is The Reserve Fund, which was established in 1971 
by Bruce R. Bent and Henry B.R. Brown.87 
                                                 
73 Gennaioli, N., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.W., A Model of Shadow Banking, 68 THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE 
4 (2013) 
74 Supra note 61. 
75 Id. 
76 Supra note 5. 
77 Id. 
78 See, e.g., Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (H.R. 4986, Pub.L. 96–
221)  
79 Section 5, R.A. No. 8791 
80 Section 5, R.A. No. 8791 
81 Section 249, P.D. No. 69 
82 Pozsar, Z., Adrian, T., Ashcraft, A.B., and Boesky, H., Shadow Banking (2010), available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1640545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1640545 (last retrieved on 05 March 
2017) 
83 Couldock Bohan v. Societe Generale Sec. Corp., 93 F. Supp.2d 220 (D. Conn. 2000) 
84 In re Cormack, 124 B.R. 806 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) 
85 Tibble V. Edison International, CV 07-5359 SVW (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Jul. 8, 2010) 
86 Paine, Webber V. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983) 
87 Finkle, V., Shadow Banking (2017), available at: http://businessresearcher.sagepub.com/sbr-1863-
101611-2765611/20170102/shadow-banking (last retrieved on 05 March 2017) 
 
B. Expansion of the Shadow Banking Market 
 
Four legislative acts in the U.S. enabled the expansion of the shadow banking 
market: (i) the McFadden Act of 1927, (ii) the Banking Act of 1933 (which spawned an 
important regulatory rule called “Regulation Q”), (iii) the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
and (iv) the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. 
 
1. McFadden Act of 1927 
 
The McFadden Act of 1927 placed a restriction on interstate branching among 
banks in the U.S. Each national bank could only put up branches within the state where 
it is located.88 This limitation on branch banking gave a competitive advantage to money 
market funds, which were not governed by a similar prohibition.89 Compared to federal 
commercial banks, the money market funds could freely expand branch operations 
across different states.90 
 
2. Banking Act of 1933 and Regulation Q 
 
The Banking Act of 1933, which is otherwise known as the Glass-Steagall Act, 
introduced a comprehensive and nationwide banking reform to ensure the safety of bank 
deposits.91 Section 11 of the Act and Title 12, part 217 of the United States Code of 
Federal Regulations introduced Regulation Q, which prohibited commercial banks from 
offering interest on checking accounts and regulated the level of interest rates on other 
deposit accounts, such as savings accounts, time deposits, and eventually Negotiable 
Order of Withdrawal accounts.92 It placed a ceiling on the allowable rates, which can be 
adjusted by the central bank from time to time.93 
The concept of placing an interest rate ceiling is based on the experience during 
the Great Depression in the 1930s, when banks competed freely in obtaining deposits 
from the public.94 This was done by offering higher interest rates on deposit.95 Since 
increasing the bank’s interest obligation diminishes the margin between borrowing rates 
and lending rates, the bank engaged in speculative investments in order to maintain or 
increase their profitability.96 Since higher interest rates on deposits meant higher interest 
expenditures, banks must match them with assets having higher yields, which meant 
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higher risks.97 This created perverse incentives to enter into risky and speculative loans.98 
Since the borrowing clients of banks have higher probability of default, the bank is 
exposed to higher risk of bankruptcy.99 
In this environment, banks were vulnerable from becoming illiquid and insolvent, 
which prejudiced the depositors whose only security is limited to the assets of the bank 
upon dissolution.100 Regulation Q, in addition to the introduction of mandatory deposit 
insurance under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, was meant to arrest the free 
competition on bank deposits in order to eliminate these perverse incentives.101 
Regulation Q played an important role in the growth of shadow deposits.102 During 
the 1970s, there was a rapid increase in the general price of goods and services in the 
U.S. To arrest this inflation spike, the government raised interest rates to restrict credit 
and to slow down the economy. This was done through the Federal Reserve Bank, which 
raised higher interest rates on treasury bills and other short-term government debt 
securities. Higher interest rates led to a higher savings rate, which decreased consumer 
expenditures, which in turn limited the growth of money supply, and which would finally 
curb inflation.103 
Meanwhile, the interest on bank deposit accounts was capped by Regulation Q.104 
Eventually, yields on short-term government debt securities exceeded the interest rate 
ceiling on bank deposits.105 Since the former are safer investments than the latter, and 
yielded higher interest, the lending public shifted their savings from banks to money 
market funds, which institutionalized the purchase of government securities.106 
 
3. Investment Company Act of 1940 
 
 The Investment Company Act of 1940 provided the regulatory framework for 
money market funds, which were incorporated under the Act as investment companies.107 
The Act classified these companies into three: face-amount certificate companies, unit 
investment trusts, and management companies. Face-amount certificate companies 
issue debt instruments that are repayable at par. Unit investment trusts issue redeemable 
securities representing participation rights in a basket of financial assets. They are 
established through agency, custodianship or trust indenture. Management companies 
are those that are neither face-amount certificate companies nor unit investment trusts. 
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The main thrust of the Act is to build public confidence in holding securities.108 These 
introduced new investment vehicles other than deposits in commercial banks. 
 
4. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 
 
 Lastly, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 prohibited a bank holding company 
in one state to acquire ownership interest in another bank located in another state, 
including interstate mergers.109 No similar special prohibition governs money market 
funds. 
 
C. How Traditional Banks Absorbed Shadow Banking Functions 
 
 There were three legislative acts in the U.S. that tried to eliminate the competitive 
advantage of money market funds over commercial banks: (i) the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, (ii) the Garn-St. Germain Depository 
Institutions Act of 1982, and (iii) the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994. 
 These Acts further contributed to the growth of shadow banking by allowing 
commercial banks to compete with money market funds by issuing shadow deposits 
themselves. There were therefore two pathways for the issuance of shadow deposits: 
commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions. In the Philippines, this is equivalent 
to the co-existence of banks and non-banking financial institutions both having quasi-
banking functions. 
 
1. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 
 
 The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 
expanded the control of the Federal Reserve to cover more types of banks.110 Credit 
unions and savings and loan associations were authorized to issue demand deposits.111 
The Act also lifted the prohibition on bank mergers.112 More importantly, it eliminated the 
authority of the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe interest rate ceilings on bank 
deposits, effectively repealing Regulation Q under the Glass-Steagall Act, with a 
staggered implementing period of 6 years.113 The Act also legitimized the offering of 
Negotiable Order of Withdrawal accounts and increased the coverage of mandatory 
deposit insurance.114 All these factors had the effect of lifting the disadvantages of banks 
compared to money market funds.115 
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2. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 
 
 The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 allowed commercial 
banks to offer money market deposit accounts and Super Negotiable Orders of 
Withdrawal.116 These products directly competed with the money market accounts offered 
by money market mutual funds. 
 
3. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 
 
 Riegel-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 allowed 
federally chartered banks to compete with state-chartered banks, and removed 
prohibitions on interstate branch banking. 
 
C. Shadow Banking in the Philippines 
 
Shadow banking is legitimized in the Philippine financial system through the 
issuance of quasi-banking licenses by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Two types of 
entities may carry out quasi-banking functions: (i) banks and (ii) non-bank financial 
institutions. 
Section 249 of P.D. No. 69 (1972), which amended certain sections of the National 
Internal Revenue Code, states: 
 
“Quasi-banking activities shall refer to borrowing funds from twenty or more personal or 
corporate lenders at any one time, through the issuance, endorsement or acceptance of 
debt instruments of any kind other than deposits for the borrower's own accounts, or 
through the issuance of certificates of assignment or similar instruments, with recourse, or 
of repurchase agreements for purposes of relending or purchasing receivables and other 
similar obligations.” 
 
In short, quasi-banking is simply the issuance of deposit substitutes. The same 
definition was carried over in P.D. No. 71 (1972), which amended R.A. No. 337 (General 
Banking Act). 
P.D. No. 129 (1973) allowed the Monetary Board to grant quasi-banking licenses 
to Investment Houses. P.D. No. 1738 (1980) defined “non-bank financial intermediary” as 
one authorized by the Central Bank of the Philippines to perform quasi-banking functions. 
R.A. No. 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) placed non-bank financial institutions 
with quasi-banking functions under the regulatory oversight of the Bangko Sentral ng 
Pilipinas (BSP). 
R.A. No. 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000) reaffirmed the regulatory power 
of the BSP over quasi-banks. It also provides a stricter regime of supervision. Section 5 
states, “[T]he Monetary Board may prescribe ratios, ceilings, limitations, or other forms of 
regulation on the different types of accounts and practices of banks and quasi-banks 
which shall, to the extent feasible, conform to internationally accepted standards, 
including of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).” 
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PART VII: HOW DEPOSIT SUBSTITUTES REPLICATE THE SAFETY FEATURES OF 
DEPOSITS 
 
 Unlike ordinary bank deposits, deposit substitutes are not insured by the Philippine 
Deposit Insurance Corporation.117 Instead, the lender is protected through the 
collateralized nature of the transaction, or any security device that the financial institution 
may offer to build confidence on the product.118 This is how deposit substitutes 
purportedly replicate the safety features of ordinary bank deposits.119 
In this section, we shall discuss some of these collateral and security features in 
the following BSP-recognized120 deposit substitutes: (i) repurchase agreements or 
“repos”, (ii) promissory notes, (iii) certificates of assignment with recourse, and (iv) 
certificates of participation with recourse. 
 
A. Repos 
 
Through a repo, the lender and the bank enter into a sell-and-buyback agreement 
over a debt instrument for the purpose of replicating a collateralized loan transaction.121 
The lender acts as a buyer of the debt instrument, and gives cash funds (representing the 
price) to the bank.122 The bank then delivers the debt instrument to the lender, with a 
promise to buy it back at maturity. Upon the arrival of the maturity date, the bank 
repurchases the debt instrument from the lender. The price in the original sale transaction 
and the buyback price are fixed in such a way that the lender obtains an amount 
equivalent or nearly equivalent to a debt with interest. In effect, the two parties replicate 
the financial incidents of a simple loan, which is structured as a sale-and-buyback 
agreement.123 This is how repos replicate the features of an ordinary bank deposit, which 
in essence is a simple loan. This is usually worded as follows:124 
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B. Promissory Notes 
 
A promissory note is a “solemn acknowledgment of a debt and a formal 
commitment to repay it on the date and under the conditions agreed upon by the borrower 
and the lender.”125 It functions as a deposit substitute by creating a debt liability on the 
part of the bank, which undertakes to repay a principal amount with interest to the lender 
at maturity.126 The bank may secure the note with collateral. This is usually worded as 
follows:127 
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C. Certificates of Assignment with Recourse 
 
 Through a certificate of assignment with recourse, the bank assigns, conveys, and 
transfers debt securities or instruments to a lender of funds, for consideration.128 If the 
principal debtor under the debt security or instrument defaults, the lender may still collect 
from the bank. To replicate interest income, the sum of the face value and interest or yield 
on the debt security or instrument is higher than the consideration paid by the lender of 
funds to the bank. The bank foregoes some income on the debt security or instrument in 
exchange for liquidity, while the lender has a receivable evidenced by the certificate. This 
is usually worded as follows:129 
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D. Certificates of Participation with Recourse 
  
 Through a certificate of participation with recourse, the bank grants or assigns a 
share of its future income on debt securities or instruments to a lender, for a 
consideration.130 Again, the amount of the consideration is less than the amount of the 
share of the lender in the future income. This is usually worded as follows:131 
 
 
 
PART VIII: WHY LONG-TERM DEBT INSTRUMENTS CANNOT REPLICATE THE 
SAFETY FEATURES OF DEPOSITS AND DEPOSIT SUBSTITUTES 
 
When a borrower issues a bond, note, or any debt instrument, the interest on the 
instrument is stipulated in advance.132 We shall call this the “contractual” interest rate, 
which is usually locked over the life of the instrument as agreed upon by the parties. 
During the time that the lender holds the instrument—let us say for 10 years—the interest 
rates of other bonds, notes, and other debt instruments in the market either change or 
remain the same.133 More often than not, they change due to inflation.134 Hence, three 
possibilities happen while a lender holds a debt instrument with a fixed contractual interest 
rate: 
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1. Market interest rates are equal to the contractual interest rate; 
2. Market interest rates are higher than the contractual interest rate; or 
3. Market interest rates are lower than the contractual interest rate. 
 
Let us examine the effects of these three scenarios on a bond issuance. Suppose 
that a borrowing entity issues a 10-year zero-coupon treasury bond with a face value of 
P30 billion, and an annually compounding interest rate of 10%. Since the instrument is a 
zero-coupon bond, the borrowing entity will pay the lender P30 billion at the time of 
maturity, which is the end of the 10-year period, while the lender will obtain the bond at 
discount (i.e. less than P30 billion), such that the return on investment will be equal to 
10% interest rate, annually compounded. 
The price of the bond can be obtained through the following formula:135  
  
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =
𝐹
(1 + 𝑟)𝑛
 
  
The face value (F) is P30 billion. The interest rate (r) is 10%, compounded 
annually. The time to maturity (n) is 10 years. Applying the formula, the price of the bond 
at the time of issuance is P11.57 billion. Accordingly, the lender will pay the borrower 
P11.57 billion in the beginning of the first year, expecting to retire the bond at maturity for 
P30 billion. The difference between the face value of P30 billion and bond price at time 
of issuance of P11.57 billion is P18.43 billion, which is called the “discount” on the bond 
and which represents possible investment income on the part of the lender.136 
The lender may, of course, purchase another bond in the market from another 
issuer, but one crucial decision point is as follows: between two bonds having equivalent 
risk (called “benchmark bonds”), no rational lender will purchase that bond which yields 
a lower return.137 A fair return on a bond must be equal to the market interest rate of 
benchmark bonds.138 This market rate is also called the “expected return” or “required 
return” on the bond because it is that rate which is expected or required by an investor 
for a given level of risk.139 The “fair price” of a bond is that price which is determined by 
the expected or required return.140 
The fair price of the bond depends on the three scenarios on market interest rates. 
If the market interest rate of benchmark bonds is equal to the contractual interest rate of 
10% at the time of issuance, then the fair price of the bond is exactly equivalent to the 
amount to be paid by the lender to the borrower, which is P11.57 billion. 
If the market interest rate of benchmark bonds is higher than the contractual 
interest rate of 10% at the time of issuance, then the fair price of the bond is lower than 
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the amount to be paid by the lender to the borrower at time of issuance. Hence, if the 
market interest rate is 12%, then applying the same formula as above, the fair price of the 
bond is P9.66 billion, which is lower than the amount paid by the lender, which is P11.57 
billion. This means that the lender can obtain another bond with an equivalent risk from 
another borrowing entity, at a lower (i.e. more attractive) issue price. 
If the market interest rate of benchmark bonds is lower than the contractual interest 
rate of 10% at the time of issuance, then the fair price of the bond is higher than the 
amount to be paid by the lender to the borrower at time of issuance. If the market interest 
rate is 8%, then applying the same formula, the fair price of the bond is P13.9 billion, 
which is higher than the amount to be paid by the lender at P11.57 billion. This means 
that the lender can obtain a return higher than what is expected by the market from a 
bond of equivalent risk. 
With increased transparency of data in the financial markets, investors can easily 
calculate if a bond is being issued at a fair price.141 This compels the holder of a bond to 
sell the instrument at a price determined by market interest rates. The riskiness of a long-
term debt instrument revolves around this interaction between bond prices and market 
rates. This is a risk that is not present in ordinary bank deposits, and by extension, in 
deposit substitutes. 
Let us illustrate this through the same bond issuance discussed above, but this 
time in an environment of increasing market interest rates, which usually happens during 
a period of inflation. Let us suppose that the contractual interest rate of 10% is equal to 
the market interest rate at the time of issuance, but during the life of the bond, the market 
interest rate starts rising, as follows: 
 
Year 
Market 
Interest 
Rate 
Time to 
Maturity 
(beginning 
year) 
Bond Price in PHP 
(beginning year) 
1 10% 10  11,566,298,682.89  
2 12% 9  10,818,300,749.45  
3 14% 8  10,516,771,645.52  
4 16% 7  10,614,885,896.57  
5 16% 6  12,313,267,640.02  
6 16% 5  14,283,390,462.43  
7 16% 4  16,568,732,936.41  
8 16% 3  19,219,730,206.24  
9 16% 2  22,294,887,039.24  
10 16% 1  25,862,068,965.52  
11 20% 0  30,000,000,000.00  
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As we have stated previously, two basic safety features of deposits are capital 
preservation and liquidity, and these features cannot be replicated in a long-term debt 
instrument. 
Note that there is a significant risk of capital loss, especially in the first half of the 
life of the bond. When market interest rate increased from 10% in year 1 to 12% in year 
2, the bond price in year 2 (i.e. P10.8 billion) falls below the initial investment in year 1, 
which is P11.57 billion. This negates the idea of capital preservation or safety of principal. 
Second, the risk of capital loss diminishes as the time to maturity decreases. It is 
only at year 5 that the investor recovers from the unrealized capital loss. At maturity, the 
investor is able to retire the bond at P30 billion, even with an absurdly high market interest 
rate of 20%. However, the fact that the investor may have to wait for a longer investment 
horizon before recovering his initial investment negates the idea of liquidity. 
 
PART IX: CRITIQUE OF THE PEACe BONDS DECISION 
 
In the previous section, we illustrated how a long-term debt instrument cannot have 
the twin features of capital preservation and liquidity. We are now ready to demonstrate 
this using the PEACe Bonds in Banco De Oro, et al. vs. Republic (2015 and 2016). 
At the time of the issuance of the PEACe Bonds, they have a face value (F) of P35 
billion, a contractual interest rate (r) of 12.75%, and a time to maturity (n) of 10 years.142 
Since the interest rate is compounded semi-annually, the formula for the bond price is as 
follows: 
 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =
𝐹
(1 +
𝑟
2)
2𝑛
 
 
Applying the formula, the bond has a value of P10.17 billion at the time of 
origination—i.e. RCBC paid P10.17 billion for a bond that the government promised to 
pay at P35 billion on the 10th year.143 The difference between the face value of P35 billion 
and bond value of P10.17 billion is P24.83 billion. This represents the interest income to 
RCBC if it holds the bond until maturity. 
Now suppose that RCBC holds the bond for 1 year and decides to sell it at the end 
of the 1st year. Suppose also that the market interest rate at the time of sale is 15%. This 
means that bonds having an equivalent risk profile as the PEACe Bonds pay investors a 
yield of 15%, which is the yield that investors would expect from similar instruments. 
Applying the bond price formula and using the market interest rate of 15%, the 
PEACe Bonds at the end of the 1st year have a fair price of P9.5 billion. Since RCBC 
purchased the bond at P10.17 billion in the date of origination and sells it at P9.5 billion 
in the date of sale, RCBC suffers a loss of P670 million. This decrease in the price of 
PEACe Bonds is due to an increase in market interest rates to 15%. 
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Now suppose that, in order not to realize any loss, RCBC decides not to sell the 
bonds, and waits until the bond price will increase. Suppose also that benchmark interest 
rates remain at 15% until the end of the 2nd year. Applying the formula, the PEACe Bonds 
sell at P11 billion. Since RCBC purchased the bond at P10.17 billion in the date of 
origination and sells it at P11 billion in the date of sale, RCBC profited by P830 million. 
However, RCBC had to wait for 2 years. 
Now suppose that China Bank is the buying party which purchased the PEACe 
Bonds at P11 billion. China Bank holds the instrument for 1 year. Benchmark interest 
rates continue to rise, and on the 3rd year, interest rates are at 18%. China Bank sells the 
PEACe Bonds at the end of the 3rd year. Applying the formula, the price of the bond is 
P10.47 billion. The bank suffers a loss of P530 million. 
If the current holder of the bond does not want to realize the loss, it will simply hold 
the bond for a longer period of time until the bond price will suffice to cover its acquisition 
cost. Notice that in both examples, investors RCBC and China Bank could not 
immediately withdraw the amounts of their investments within the desired time period. 
The fact that the holder of the instrument cannot recover the full principal amount of his 
investment within any time period that he chooses is incompatible with the very idea that 
the instrument is a deposit substitute. 
 
PART X: TOWARD A NEW DEFINITION OF DEPOSIT SUBSTITUTES 
 
 In light of the foregoing discussion, it is submitted that Section 22(Y) of the NIRC 
should be amended to exclude long-term debt instruments from the scope of deposit 
substitutes, with the following proposed change: 
 
“[A]n alternative from of obtaining funds from the public (the term 'public' means borrowing 
from twenty [20] or more individual or corporate lenders at any one time) other than 
deposits, through the issuance, endorsement, or acceptance of debt instruments maturing 
not more than 1 year from the date of origination, for the borrowers own account, for 
the purpose of relending or purchasing of receivables and other obligations, or financing 
their own needs or the needs of their agent or dealer.” 
 
 This change rules out the possibility of classifying high-risk debt instruments, such 
as 10-year zero-coupon treasury notes, as deposit substitutes. The new definition would 
automatically subject the interest income on said instruments to the regular income tax 
rate, and not to 20% final tax, without prejudice to the imposition of creditable withholding 
tax under Revenue Regulation No. 14-2012 dated 07 November 2012. 
 The stability and predictability of the tax treatment of financial instruments are 
crucial in building investor confidence in the Philippine fiscal environment. The tax system 
must allow investors to plan for a long-term investment horizon and to forecast reasonable 
risks and returns, without being exposed to unexpected and drastic reinterpretation of tax 
rules. This can only be achieved if tax rules on financial instruments bear a rational 
connection with the nature and function of these instruments. 
